Director of Public Prosecutions v Saddington (2000) The Times, November 1 QBD
The Statutes
Section 185(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988,
"Motor vehicle" is as a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.
Section 87(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988,
It is an offence to drive on a road a motor vehicle of any class otherwise than in accordance with a licence authorising him drive a motor vehicle of that class.
The Facts
The defendant had been seen by a police officer to pass through a red traffic light while riding an unregistered motorised scooter known as a "Go-ped" on the inside lane of a road.
He failed to stop when the officer activated his vehicle’s sirens and flashing lights but attempted to avoid apprehension by riding through a narrow gap between parked cars before picking up the Go-ped and running with it into a public house.
He was found to be disqualified for holding or obtaining a licence. The Go-ped had not been adapted in any way. It had a small foot platform attached to a two barred sub-frame on which the passenger would stand, and was powered by a 22.5cc engine attached to its rear with a maximum speed of 20mph.
The braking system could not stop the Go-ped safely from any great speed or when applied in an emergency situation, as severe braking would cause the back wheel to lift.
It had inadequate steering and no basic services normally associated to a motor vehicle such as lights, suspension, clutch or controls to enable a rider to control the machine properly.
At issue was whether the unregistered motor scooter was a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of section 185(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Section 87(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 made it an offence to drive on a road a motor vehicle of any class otherwise than in accordance with a licence authorising him drive a motor vehicle of that class.
His Lordship said that both parties accepted that the Go-ped was a "vehicle" and a "mechanically propelled vehicle". The issue was whether the Go-ped was intended for use on the roads. The justices found that it would not be able to comply with Construction and Use Regulations and UK vehicle safety standards so as to satisfy road traffic legislation relating to motor vehicles. The defendant submitted that the Go-ped would not be accepted by the Department of Transport for registration, or for use on the roads under construction and use regulations made under section 189 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
The Go-ped distributors’ literature stated that it did not conform to UK vehicle safety standards and was not intended for operation on public streets, roads or pathways, should not be used in traffic or on wet, frozen, oily or loose surfaces, and that serious injuries could result from its unsafe operation.
A large number of scooters like the Go-ped were in circulation and many of them were more sophisticated in terms of the control systems.
His Lordship said that the test to be applied in determining whether a vehicle was a motor vehicle under section 185 of the 1988 Act was that laid down in Burns v Currell (1963) 2 QB 433, 440, namely, whether a reasonable person looking at the vehicle would say that one of its users would be a road user.
In deciding that question, the reasonable man would not have to envisage what some man losing his senses would do with a vehicle; nor an isolated user or a user in an emergency.
The real question was whether some general use on the roads was contemplated as one of the uses, and the justices had to ask if the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that any reasonable person looking at the vehicle would say that one of its uses would be use on the road.
His Lordship said that that test should not readily be departed from. Contrary to the justices’ apparent view, the roadworthiness of a conveyance, that is, its capability to be used safely on roads, was not decisive of the question of whether its use on the road must be contemplated.
There was no obvious place of use other than a road. The Go-ped could not negotiate rough ground, soft or uneven surfaces and was not designed for use in a place other than a road, such as was a dumper truck used for road construction work.
The Burns v Currell test could not, however, be applied merely by a process of elimination. It could not be said that because there was no place other than a hard, flat surface on which a Go-ped could be used, it must be intended for use on a road.
The temptation to use them on roads was considerable, notwithstanding their limitations. They provided a ready means of getting through traffic on short journeys on urban roads. A reasonable person would say that one of its uses would be general use on the roads, not merely isolated use or use by a man losing his senses.
The design and capabilities of it would be considered in the context of an assessment of the time pressure upon many people and their wishes to get through traffic quickly. Surrender to the temptation to use it on roads would not be an isolated occurrence even though the vehicle might not be roadworthy.
General use on the roads was to be contemplated. Therefore, a Go-ped which was considered a mechanically propelled vehicle, was one intended for use on the roads within the meaning of section 185(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, for which a driving licence and third party insurance were required.
The Decision
A motorised scooter known as a "Go-ped" was a motor vehicle for the purposes of section 185(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, in relation to which a driving licence and policy of third party insurance were required.
The Queen’s Bench Divisional Court so held when allowing an appeal by the prosecution by way of case stated by , against their dismissal of two informations laid against Saddington, alleging that he,
(i) drove a motor vehicle, namely an unregistered motorised scooter, on a road while disqualified from holding or obtaining a driving licence, contrary
to section 103(1)(b) of the Road Traffic 1988 and Schedule 2 to the
Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, and
(ii) used a motor vehicle, namely an unregistered motorised scooter, on a road when there was not in force in relation to that use such a policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third-party risks as complied with the requirements of Part VI of the Road Traffic Act 1988, contrary to section 143(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.
Comment
This could be headed, what is the difference between a Go-Kart and a "Go-ped?" Answer, 37 years.
Burns v Currell (1963) was decided under S. 253(1) Road Traffic Act 1960. (8 & 9 Eliz 2 c 16), and it is worth looking at the case whilst remembering it is the principle of law that counts.
In the expression "intended or adapted for use on roads" in s 253(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960, the test of being "intended" is whether a reasonable person looking at the vehicle would say that one of its uses would be a road use .
In Burns the appellant drove a mechanically propelled vehicle known as a Go-Kart on a road. The Go-Kart had its engine at the rear, had a tubular frame mounted on four small wheels and was equipped with a single seat, steering-wheel and column, and an efficient silencer. It had brakes which operated on the rear wheels only, and it had no horn, springs, parking-brake, driving-mirror or wings. The evidence was that the appellant had used the Go-Kart on the road on one occasion only, and there was no evidence that other people used Go-Karts on the road.
The appellant was convicted of certain offences against the Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations, 1955, and the Road Traffic Act, 1960. The Appeal centered on the question of whether the Go-Kart was a motor vehicle and a motor car within the meaning of s 253(1) and (2) of the Act of 1960,
Held – The convictions must be quashed, because, applying the test stated at letter above, there was not sufficient evidence before the justices to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable person looking at the Go-Kart would say that one of its uses would be a use on the road , nor that it was fit or apt for use on the road, although it was capable of such use.
This most recent case reads a bit like the "Keystone Cops", sirens on, lights flashing, and an attempt to decamp (why do only villain's decamp? Probably because it is defined as a prompt departure.); to avoid apprehension by riding through a narrow gap between parked cars before picking up the "vehicle" and running into a public house. But to no avail, he couldn't escape the long arm of the law.
Rob Jerrard