Plange v Chief Constable of South Humberside Police, The Times, 23 March 1992, concerns the duty of police officers under s.24(6) of Pace Act 1984. It is of immense importance how an officer exercises his discretion under the section since the outcome may be an unlawful arrest resulting in an action for false imprisonment in a County Court. The relevant sub-section is s.24, arrest without warrant for arrestable offences: (6) Where a constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an arrestable offence has been committed, he may arrest without a warrant anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of the offence.
In 1987 the plaintiff was alleged to have committed an assault. The complaint was subsequently withdrawn, but the plaintiff was nevertheless arrested and taken to a police station and detained for four hours. He was released without charge.
The issue at the end of the trial concerneed the legality of the arrest. If it was lawful the claim would fail.
The County Court Judge had ruled that there was no case to go to the jury and dismissed the plaintiff's action.
The Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal by the plaintiff, held that where a police officer arrested a person on reasonable suspicion that he had committed an arrestable offence and the arrested person could prove that the arresting officer knew, at the time of the arrest, that there was no possibility of a charge being made, then the arrest would be unlawful because the arresting officer had acted on some irrelevant consideration, or for an improper purpose
Civil actions against the police have increased in recent years, however, Court of Appeal decisions have placed the matter in prospective and shown that the police do not need to take positive steps to make further enquiries once a reasonable suspicion has crystallised in their minds.
Reasonable grounds suggest an objective test, this is lower than the standard sufficient to prove a prima facie case. In the course of their duties constables act for various reasons, eg, information received, radio messages, telephone calls, or perhaps the word of an informer; all are valid reasons. It is not surprising that the Courts have allowed reasonable scope: whilst setting limits.
As a result of Plange certain policy decisions may need to be reviewed. There are be Forces that have a policy of instructing officers to arrest husbands for domestic violence. The husband is taken to the station and kept for a cooling off period. When officers arrest juveniles they have a pretty good idea that they will inevitable be cautioned.
In Chapman v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 89 Cr.App.R. 190, it was held that a constable who suspects a person of committing an offence to which only a limited power of arrest applies cannot later defend himself on the footing that the facts might have fallen into a more serious offence category.
The Court found that the officer believed that a fellow officer had suffered an assault. The Court concluded this was a common assault, (no known injuries), which is not an arrestable offence. The officer had purportedly exercised his powers under s.26(6) Pace Act and entered a flat to do so: in the course of which he was assaulted in the execution of his duty. The Court said they were not holding that the officer did not believe he had reasonable suspicion, they were saying the conviction could not stand because there was no finding that he did.
In Castorina v Chief Constable of Surrey (1988) 138 NLJ 180, it was held that failure to follow an obvious course of inquiry or verification in exceptional circumstances may, however, be grounds for attacking the exercise of the power. Woolf suggested three questions:
(i)Did the arresting officer suspect that the person arrested was guilty of the offence? This is subjective to the officer's mind;
(ii)Was there reasonable cause for that suspicion: this is a matter of law for the Judge;
(iii)If the answer to these questions is affirmative, then the officer has a discretion to arrest (he may) arrest, and the discretion must be exercised in accordance with the principles set down in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.
Ward v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary (1986) The Times, 26 June, was also an action for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment. Following rioting in Bristol a detective sergeant received information that a television set had been carried into a premises. He went to the premises were he was admitted voluntarily. Whilst searching he found 13 easter eggs. He did not believe the claim that they were purchased at 37p each: the price was too low and there were no price labels on them. He arrested because he had reasonable cause to suspect an arrestable offence had been committed.
The Court of Appeal held he had reasonable cause, "looking objectively as one should, DS Edwards did have reasonable cause for making the arrest. He had found the eggs in circumstances which aroused his suspicion and which called for an explanation. He was given an explanation which was apparently untrue. He disbelieved it, and on good grounds".
Mohammed-Holgate v Duke [1984] AC 437, concerned the theft of jewellery from a premises in which the plaintiff lodged. When items turned up in a local jeweller's shop the description given to police fitted the plaintiff. She was arrested on reasonable suspicion. The plaintiff maintained her innocence and was never charged. She made a claim to to County Court and was awarded £1,000 damages.
The basis of the claim was that the power had been exercised to induce the plaintiff to confess. The detective constable knew that without a confession he would not be able to charge the plaintiff, and by depriving her of her liberty there was a likelihood that she would confess.
It was held, by the House of Lords, that in deciding whether or not to make an arrest as in this case, a constable was entitled to take into consideration as a relevant matter the fact that the suspect would be more likely to tell the truth if detained for questioning at a police station rather than questioning at the suspect's home.
In Plange Parker LJ; said, "It must be borne in mind that under s.37 of Pace it was for the custody officer, not the arresting officer, to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to charge an arrested person and that the arresting officer's private opinions as to the likelihood or otherwise of a charge were not relevant. If he satisfied s.24(6) and took the arrested person to the police station he was, save in exceptional circumstances, properly fulfilling his duty.
To sum up, where a constable's reasons for suspicion are sufficient, he is under no obligation to go looking for further evidence, or to probe every explanation before exercising his powers of arrest; as Lord Devlin said in Shaaban Bin Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] AC 942, at 948; "suspicion in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: 'I suspect but I cannot prove'." However on the authority of Plange, if he knows there will be no charge he cannot use Pace 1984 Act. According to a report in The Times, on 11 July 1992 David Plange has been awarded £13,750 damages in his civil action against the police.