R v Loveridge (William) Regina v Lee (Charles Sonny) R v Loveridge (Christine)

(a) take or attempt to take in any court any photograph, or with a view to publication make or attempt to make in any court any portrait or sketch of any person, being a judge of the court or a juror or a witness in or a party to any proceedings before the court, whether civil or criminal; or

The principal issue raised by the applications for leave to appeal against conviction arose out of the fact that the police had arranged for the Loveridge defendants to be filmed by a video camera, without their knowledge, while they were at a magistrates' court. The purpose of that was to be able to compare those pictures with pictures which had been taken earlier by closed-circuit television cameras, so as to connect the defendants with the robbery.

The film taken at the court was admitted in evidence and used by an expert called by the Crown to establish that the Loveridge defendants were pictured on the video film taken by the closed-circuit television cameras. In support of their contention that the evidence should not have been admitted, the defendants relied upon their right to respect for their private life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. They also relied on the fact that they were filmed at the court contrary to s. 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925, which prohibits photography in court, and Codes D4.1 and D4.2 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (s. 66) Codes of Practice and s. 78 of the 1984 Act.

The judge had overruled the defendants' submissions and had allowed the evidence to be given. He had, however, considered that the video pictures taken at the magistrates' court probably contravened s. 41 of the 1925 Act. The judge did not consider that the taking of the photographs was conduct which should be approved of or be encouraged but he felt no unfairness was caused which operated so as to adversely affect the fairness of the proceedings.

The language of s. 41 was very wide. The prosecution would have liked to argue that the language of the section should not be applied to video recordings but agreed that it would be strange if the section applied to a single photograph and not to filming, which would have a more serious impact on the administration of justice than the taking of a still photograph. Obviously when the Act was passed in 1925, video cameras were not in contemplation. However, their Lordships had no doubt that the section should be applied in a way which took into account the modern developments in photography.

Accordingly, their Lordships had come to the conclusion that a filming which took place at the court contravened s. 41. The conduct was therefore unlawful. The defendants had also placed reliance upon Code D on the practice for the identification of persons by police officers.

The prosecution had submitted that the necessary authority had been obtained to comply with Code D4.2 (taking a photograph of an arrested person without consent). The evidence that that was the position was not entirely satisfactory. However, if there was any defect in relation to compliance with Code D, it would be of a technical nature. The defendants would not have been prejudiced and their Lordships agreed with the judge that there had been no unfairness involved.

That left the defendants' reliance on the Human Rights Act 1998. Article 8 of the Convention provided a right to respect for private and family life. It was argued that to film the Loveridge defendants as happened here was an infringement of article 8. Although the court was a public place, where the defendants were photographed was part of the building where members of the public did not have access. It had always been the position at common law that a prisoner retained all his rights as a citizen other than those which were inconsistent with his status as a prisoner. The position was no different with regard to someone who was in custody awaiting trial. Quite apart from the provisions of the 1925 Act, their Lordships were of the opinion that it was not desirable for filming to take place within the precinct of a court for the purposes of assisting the defendants' prosecution.

A court should be a building to which those who had been, or might be charged could attend without concerns as to activities of that nature. Their Lordships would therefore readily conclude that the conduct complained of infringed article 8.1. In any event, secret filming in a place to which the public had free access could amount to an infringement even where there was no private element to the events filmed. Secret filming was considered objectionable because it was not open to those who were the subject of the filming to take any action to prevent it: see R v Broadcasting Standards Commission, ex p. British Broadcasting Corporation, The Times, 12 April 2000; (2000) 3 WLR 1327.

Article 8.2 provided an exception where the interference was for the prevention of disorder or crime. However, it was a requirement of article 8.2 that the interference should be in accordance with the law. The filming was contrary to law. Their Lordships therefore had no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that there had been a breach of article 8. However, so far as the outcome of the appeal was concerned, the breach of article 8 was only relevant if it interfered with the right of the defendants to a fair hearing.

Giving full weight to the breach of the Convention, their Lordships were satisfied that the contravention of article 8 did not interfere with the fairness of the hearing. The judge had been entitled to rule as he did. The position was the same so far as s. 78 of the 1984 Act was concerned.

Collectively the evidence of the involvement of each of the defendants was overwhelming. Their Lordships were satisfied the trial was perfectly fair and the convictions were not in any way unsafe.

Secret filming by the police of defendants in the cell area of a magistrates' court was unlawful and a breach of their right to privacy which, since it was not in accordance with the law, could not be justified. However, a judge had been entitled to admit the film in evidence at the defendants' trial as it had not interfered with the fairness of the trial. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, so held in a reserved judgment dismissing the appeals of William Loveridge, Charles Sonny Lee and Christine Love-ridge against their convictions at Crown Court on 9 March 2000 for robbery and taking a motor vehicle without consent

The Broadcasting Standards Commission was entitled to conclude that secret filming of transactions in a shop was an infringement of the privacy of the company which owned the shop.

The Court of Appeal so held in allowing the appeal of the Broadcasting Standards Commission (`BSC') against the decision of Forbes J in the Queen's Bench Division on 9 July 1999 (The Times, 9 July 1999) to quash its adjudication upholding a complaint by DSG Retail Ltd, trading as Dixons, that secret filming by the BBC of transactions in its stores in connection with the making of a Watchdog programme broadcast on 27 March 1997 was an unwarranted infringement of its privacy.

The taking of photographs in court, or the publication of such photographs, is sometimes punished as contempt (see The Times, 15 July 1986), but may also be punished as a summary offence (carrying a level-3 fine) under the CJA 1925, s. 41, which also deals with sketches.

The publication of sketches drawn from memory once outside the court is not prohibited. This is, of course, why we see so many of these types of sketch on TV and in the media.

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