Speed Trap Evidence S.69 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
Sometimes; statutory interpretation will result in hard cases: it is therefore good to see common sense applied.
Darby v Director of Public Prosecutions (1994) The Times 4 November was an appeal by way of case stated from a conviction of driving a motor vehicle in excess of a restricted speed limit contrary to sections 81 and 89 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 and Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.
The Queen's Bench Divisional Court held the GR Speedmanspeed trap device was a computer and its reading was admissible in evidence without certification under section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
There have been previous cases on s.69. R v Shephard ([1991] 93 Cr.App.R.139 concerned removal of till rolls by a store detective, Lord Griffiths said "She (the detective) said she was thoroughly familiar with the operation of the till rolls and of the computer, albeit she did not pretend to any technical understanding of the operation of the computer. The defendant did not give evidence and was convicted. If the till rolls were properly admitted in evidence that was hardly surprising for they provided the most powerful evidence of guilt"
Another important case concerning s.69 is R v Blackburn (1992) The Times, 1 December, where the Court of Appeal said of Word Processors, "their Lordships wished to make it clear that, while it was not necessary for their decision in the the case, they would have been reluctant to accept that a document produced on a word processor, rather than on a typewriter or by a quill pen, (proof here of the age of judges) thereby became a document to which section 69 applied, that is to say a document produced by a computer rather than a document produced by the writer. If such documents were covered by section 69 then the welcome reforms found in section 24 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 would be greatly diminished and marginalised. Now, with the almost universal use of word processors, if that were to be the case, almost every business document would become subject to section 69, which surely could not have been Parliament's intention when it passed the statute".
Giving judgement in the case being considered MR JUSTICE POTTS conceded that applying the ordinary meaning found in the Concise Oxford Dictionary to the word "computer" a speed trap device was a computer, the question remaining before the court was whether or not an image produced on the screen of such a computer constituted a document which would require certification to confirm that the machine was working properly and had not been tampered with. "Document" had the same meaning within the 1984 Act as in section 10(1) of the Civil Evidence Act 1968
The prosecution had submitted that the statutory provisions were wholly inconsistent with a visual image being regarded as a document since it was dependent on the machine producing it and could not be reproduced so as to have an existence of its own, it was unnecessary to reach a final conclusion on that matter in the light of the material available to the justices.
The QBD said it was preferable to adopt the approach of Lord Justice Lloyd in the Court of Appeal in R Shephard, above, and assume that the machine was a computer and the visual image admissible and to rely on the principle enunciated by Lord Griffiths in the House of Lords judgment in Shephard ([1993] AC 380, 387; (April 1993) that the burden of proving; there had been no improper use of the computer and that it was operating properly could be discharged without calling a computer expert and usually by calling someone familiar with its operation in the sense of knowing what the machine was required to do and who could say that it was doing it properly.
The QBD found that the justices had concluded that there was abundant evidence from the police constable who was an experienced and trained operator that the machine was working correctly. That conclusion was crucial.
Applying the principle adopted by Lord Griffiths, Mr Justice Potts was satisfied that the justices had properly found the case proved. Further, given their finding that the machine was functioning correctly, the justices were entitled to convict.
LORD JUSTICE ROSE, agreeing, stated that had the speed device been central to the case and if it had produced a printout or which the prosecution had relied there would have been some substance in the argument that the reading was caught by the provisions of section 10(l)(c or (d) of the Civil Evidence Act 1968.