Help Me - Duty to come to aid of fellow officer.
Costello v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police.
(1998) The Times, December 15Court of Appeal
The Facts
WPC Costello had taken into custody a young woman who had absconded from local authority care. Accompanied by Inspector Bell, she had taken the prisoner to a cell, and the prisoner had attacked her. Inspector Bell had done nothing. Hearing her screams, another officer had given assistance, but not before WPC Costello had been injured.
No General Duty of Care.
For public policy reasons the police were under no general duty of care to members of the public for their activities in the investigation and suppression of crime: Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] 1 AC 53. But that was not an absolute blanket immunity and circumstances might exceptionally arise when the police assumed a responsibility, giving rise to a duty of care to a particular member of the public.
Duty of Care to respond to emergencies.
Neither the police nor other public rescue services were under any general obligation, giving rise to a duty of care, to respond to emergency calls Alexandrou v Oxford [1993] 4 All ER 328 nor if they did respond were they to be held liable for want of care in any attempt to prevent crime or effect a rescue.
But if their own positive negligent intervention directly caused injury which would not otherwise have occurred or if it exacerbated injury or damage there might be liability: see Capital and Counties plc v Hampshire County Council [1997] QB 1004.
Just as circumstances might occur in which a police officer assumed responsibility in particular circumstances to a particular member of the public not to expose a member of the public to a specific risk of injury, so a police officer might in particular circumstances assume a similar responsibility to another police officer.
If a police officer tried to protect a member of the public from attack but failed to prevent injury to the member of the public, there should, in his Lordship's view, generally be no liability in tort on the police officer for public policy reasons. In the circumstances liability should not turn on shades of personal judgment and courage in the heat of the moment.
But Inspector Bell had acknowledged his police duty to help the plaintiff. Yet he had not, on the extraordinary facts found by the judge, even tried to do so.
Police Duty to come to the aid of a Fellow Officer.
In his Lordship's judgment, the inspector's acknowledged breach of police duty should also incrementally be seen as a breach of a legal duty of care. The duty was a duty to comply with a specific or acknowledged police duty where failure to do so would expose a fellow officer to unnecessary risk of injury.
There was a strong public policy consideration to be taken into account, namely that the law should accord with common sense and public perception. The judge had been right to say that the public would be greatly disturbed if the law held that there was no duty of care in the case.
The particular circumstances of the case should not be left solely to internal police discipline. In addition, the public interest would be ill-served if the common law did not oblige police officers to do their personal best in situations such as the one before the court.
The decision should not be interpreted in any shape or form as undermining the general principle laid down in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire.
The Decision
A police inspector accompanying a colleague for her protection was in breach of a duty of care when she came under attack and he did nothing to help her. There was a duty to comply with a specific or acknowledged police duty where failure to do so would expose a fellow officer to unnecessary risk of injury and the matter could not be left solely to internal police discipline.
The Court of Appeal so held dismissing an appeal by the defendant, the Chief Constable of Northumbria Police from a decision of Mr Justice Astill on July 30, 1997 that Inspector Stuart Bell of the defendant's force was under a duty of care owed at common law and actionable in tort to go to the assistance of the plaintiff, Julie Christine Costello, who was being attacked by a prisoner.
Comment
On the question of Duty of Care there have been a few cases of interest in recent years.
In Kent v Griffiths and Others (1998) The Times, December 23 the Court of Appeal held that accepting a 999 call might create duty to an send an ambulance.
Although the ambulance service owed no duty to the public at large to respond to a telephone call for help, once a 999 call in a serious emergency had been accepted, it was arguable that the ambulance service did have an obligation to provide the service for a named individual at a specified address.
It was therefore not appropriate to strike out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action a claim in negligence for failure of an ambulance to arrive promptly.
The Court of Appeal held, allowing the appeal of Mrs Tracey Kent, against the order of Mr Justice Moses on September 10, 1998, inter alia, striking out those parts of the statement of claim alleging that the third defendant, the London Ambulance Service, was in breach of a duty of care to the plaintiff in failing to provide an ambulance promptly to convey the plaintiff to hospital.
In Schofield v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, (1998) The Times, May 15 the Court of Appeal held that damages were recoverable by a WPC shocked by a firearm.
A policewoman who suffered post-traumatic shock after a colleague unlawfully discharged a pistol in her presence was more than a mere bystander and was entitled to recover damages against the chief constable for the resulting psychiatric injury.
The Court of Appeal held dismissing an appeal by the defendant, Peter Nobes, Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, from a decision of Sir William MacPherson of Cluny, sitting as a deputy judge of the Queen's Bench on February 28, 1997 awarding damages of £151,000 to the plaintiff, WPC Lynne Schofield.