Aggravated Vehicle-Taking: one effect of the Criminal
Justice Act 1991.
R v Bird (Simon).
The Criminal Justice Act 1991 came into force on 1 October 1992. In the Practice Statement (Criminal Justice Act 1991) (1992) The Times, 7 October, it was said that while sentencing Judges had not hitherto had regard to questions of remission or parole, with the coming into effect of the C J Act, it was necessary for them to have regard to the actual period likely to be served under the provision of the Act. This has been described as "an act of faith in the wisdom of the courts", and, moreover, the Lord Chief Justice has warned that the new rules may backfire.
It is said that the Act does however offer important new deterrent powers of punishment. That fact does not appear to be reflected in this case where the sentence was reduced on appeal.
In R v Bird 157 JP 488, we are able to see the effect of one of the new sections upon the equally new s.12A of the Theft Act 1968, inserted by the Aggravated Vehicle-Taking Act 1992. The Aggravated Vehicle-Taking Act 1992, received the Royal Assent in March and the whole of the Act came into force on 1 April, as a result of the Aggravated Vehicle-Taking Act 1992, Commencement order 1992 (S.I. 1992 No.764). The new offence is linked with and grafted onto the basic offence set out in s.12 of the Theft Act.
S.12A(1) of the Theft Act 1968 provides that, after a vehicle had been unlawfully taken, the new offence of aggravated vehicle-taking was committed if it was driven or damage was caused in one or more of the circumstances set out in paragraph (2), namely:
"(a)the vehicle was driven dangerously on a road or other public place; (b) that, owing to the driving of the vehicle an accident occurred by which injury was caused to any person; (c) that owing to the driving of the vehicle an accident occurred by which damage was caused to any property other than the vehicle; (d) that damage was caused to the vehicle."
The maximum sentence following conviction on indictment was two years or five years if paragraph (b) applied and the accident caused death.
The Taylor LJ, said that in this case all the paragraphs in s.1(2) applied. In the court's judgment the most important of those was paragraph (a), for that concerned the culpability of the driver, whereas the incidents of paragraphs (b) to (d) were, to some extent, matters of chance.
However, the fact that Parliament had fixed a maximum of five years for death as opposed to two years for injury, showed that the extent of the physical harm done was an aggravating feature, if only to reflect public reaction to maiming or death caused by bad driving. If drink was a major factor, it would often be the subject of a separate charge.
On the question of mitigation, the youth of the defendant, would in this case be less significant because s.12A was primarily aimed at young offenders, among whom such activity had become prevalent (a survey in Newcastle upon Tyne showed that the joyrider emerges as a male teenager with a disrupted family background where there is unemployment. He has little academic ability and a record of truancy see The Times, 24 September 1992.)
In this case Bird who was aged 17 had been driving appallingly dangerous for 18 miles, the car was driven at high speed and, apart from speed, there were numerous and varied incidents of dangerous driving, going through red lights, driving on the wrong side of the road at or in close proximity to a chasing police car, which was damaged and a police officer in it injured.
The injury to the officer is described as minor, however the driving could well have resulted in much more serious injury not only to the officer but at any time during the car's 18 mile erratic course.
As the law stood the sentence of 18 months detention in a young offender institution was in no way excessive. However, the powers of the court had been cut down by s.63(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. Had the Act applied, the maximum sentence on Bird would have been 12 months. Solely in those circumstances, the sentence would be reduced to 12 months.
Therefore in judging the gravity of a case of aggravated vehicle-taking, the most important of the statutory circumstances was the circumstances that the vehicle was driven dangerously on a road or other public place because that concerned the culpability of the driver, whom it would seem, if he is 15, 16 or 17 cannot be sentenced to more than 12 months because that is what s.63(4) of the 1991 Act provides.
Rob Jerrard